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Nuclear weapons, it is sometimes said, are a Faustian bargain. Their terrifying 
power lowers the risk of war, though at the risk of appalling carnage should one 
nonetheless break out.
1
 Nuclear weapons‟ defenders, in rejecting disarmament, insist 
that they play a key role in keeping the peace.
2
 In the debate over nuclear 
proliferation, they hold that the bomb has prevented war in the past and will often do 
so in the future. Some maintain that we should tolerate—sometimes even welcome—
its spread.
3
 Disarmament advocates and critics of proliferation attack both claims.
4
 
But if this is a Faustian bargain, it is an odd one. If the nuclear optimists are 
right, these weapons make the risk of war very small. We ourselves, maybe even our 
children and grandchildren, are unlikely to pay any costs at all. But that does not mean 
that the bill will never come due. Even leading nuclear optimists do not claim that 
nuclear weapons bring the risk of war down to zero. Many also hold that competition 
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and war will persist.
5
 In the long run, barring vast changes of a sort that most 
optimists consider utopian, deterrence must thus break down. Claims that “[n]uclear 
deterrence provides the United States with security and stability”6 or that “[t]here is 
no inevitability of nuclear accident or miscalculation between the United States, 
Russia, or any other nuclear power”7 are true at best in the short to medium term.  
Nuclear weapons may make us safer, but at the expense of our descendants. Every 
generation benefits until war breaks out; every postwar generation will pay the bill.  
Analysts have long recognized that nuclear weapons threaten future people.
8
 
Contemporary debates over disarmament and proliferation nearly always assume, 
however, that they are good or bad for a given country in general. In fact, we can no 
more assume a harmony of interests among generations than among nations. Just as 
the belief that all states benefit from the international status quo muddles analysis,
9
 so 
too does the assumption that all generations gain or lose from nuclear deterrence. To 
say, for example, that nuclear disarmament could “reduce U.S. security” by making 
conventional war more likely
10
 is misleading because it fails to specify which 
Americans. Compared with the status quo, disarmament might well reduce present 
people‟s security, while benefiting those born three hundred years from now. 
Similarly, if Ukraine had retained its nuclear weapons, as John Mearsheimer urged, 
this might have discouraged Russian attack.
11
 But if he is right that war is endemic to 
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 3 
international politics, it would surely have meant losing Kiev later. Seen like that, 
nuclear deterrence seems a less savory bargain. Unlike Faust, who took his sins on his 
own head, we are sending our descendants to hell. 
This article builds a bridge between recent nuclear debates and philosophical 
writings on intergenerational justice.
12
 Most critics of nuclear deterrence and 
proliferation have argued either that it is intrinsically wrong to target civilians, or that 
war is more likely than we think. Here I assume that enemy civilians are fair game, 
and show that nuclear deterrence leads to morally rotten consequences if the nuclear 
optimists are right. First, I summarize the logic of optimism and argue that, even if 
these weapons reduce the risk of conflict, catastrophic war remains inevitable. Next, I 
outline three theories of intergenerational justice—based in social contract theory, 
distributive justice, and utilitarianism—and show that in each case nuclear deterrence 
fails the test. As when we drive SUVs or run up budget deficits, here too we scoop the 
benefits while passing on the costs. It is a wicked bargain, but does much to explain 
why both fossil fuels and the bomb are so hard to give up. 
Third, I contend that states that have not yet obtained nuclear weapons have no 
justification for doing so—even if, in the short term, it would make them more secure. 
Sooner or later war will come, and instead of Baghdad or Tehran they will inherit 
rocks and radioactive ash. Advocates of horizontal proliferation like Mearsheimer and 
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Kenneth Waltz are unwittingly inviting people to exploit their own descendants. 
Nevertheless, it is Russia and the United States with their huge arsenals, not “rogue 
states,” that pose the greatest threat to the planet. Ideally, they ought to abandon all 
their nuclear weapons. But nuclear states cannot reliably bind themselves not to rearm 
in the course of a conflict. A failed attempt at disarmament could make catastrophic 
war more likely rather than less. The best Moscow and Washington can do under 
present conditions is to slash their arsenals.  
The logic of nuclear optimism implies that minimum deterrence at around 200 
warheads each should be at least as stable as the status quo. But neorealists should 
support deep cuts in Russian and American forces even if it is not. They believe major 
war cannot be banished from world politics. Given a choice between war sooner with 
limited damage, and war later with unlimited damage, we ought to prefer the former, 
since we internalize more of the costs of our own defense. Liberals, Marxists and 
constructivists may contend that nuclear war is not inevitable, and that a failed 
attempt at minimum deterrence could stymie trends toward international peace. But if 
Moscow and Washington should seek to justify huge arsenals on this ground, they 
ought to be working much harder to promote a peaceful world. 
This article strips away the fig leaf in which optimists have clothed the bomb. 
If nuclear weapons do not make war less likely, seeking to spread or perpetuate them 
is foolish. But if they do, it is exploitative. States that face a severe threat will go 
nuclear regardless of the long term consequences. Nevertheless, my argument has 
practical implications. Not all states confront dire existential threats. Sometimes 
whether they acquire the bomb will depend on fierce internal battles in which ethical 
considerations may tip the balance. For outsiders to encourage proliferation in such 
cases is not just a blunder, but a crime. Moreover, the logic of nuclear optimism 
 5 
suggests that nuclear states can and should go down to minimum deterrents. 
Nevertheless, critics of the status quo face the same challenge as do other 
environmental activists of convincing people to change policies from which they reap 
most of the benefits, and pass on most of the costs. 
A Faustian Bargain—But Who Pays the Bill? 
 Nuclear weapons, so goes the case for the defense, make aggression hard and 
deterrence easy. States can hope for only small gains if they go to war. We may chip 
away at an adversary‟s border, but if we march on his capital, we risk our own 
annihilation. Even gamblers grow cautious when faced with the bomb. Whereas states 
may start a conventional war without being sure that they can win, any state that 
provokes nuclear retaliation against its cities can be certain that it will lose. We need 
not even know that the opponent will strike back; we need only fear that he might. 
Nuclear weapons make calculating the costs and benefits of war easy. “Do we expect 
to lose one city or two? Two cities or ten?” asks Kenneth Waltz. “When these are the 
pertinent questions, political leaders stop thinking about running risks and start 
worrying about how to avoid them.”13 The bomb cuts the chance of war because it is 
so destructive.  
Nuclear weapons have several other helpful effects. First, strategies based on 
mutual assured destruction mitigate the security dilemma. With MAD we do not need 
more nuclear weapons than the opponent, or even as many; we need only enough to 
inflict unacceptable damage. Sensible leaders see that they need not run arms races; 
indeed, they can tolerate huge changes in relative power. Territorial expansion is not 
necessary, nor does it add much security. States can pursue conventional arms control 
with less anxiety. In a crisis they have little incentive to strike first, since even after 
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losing much of their force they can inflict intolerable damage on the opponent. 
Second, since most states covet their neighbors‟ territory less than they value their 
own, coercive threats are less credible than threats of retaliation. Deterrence thus 
favors defenders and reinforces the status quo. Finally, states do not have to mobilize 
public support for conventional armies. Because the bomb is an absolute weapon, they 
need no longer keep up with the Joneses (or Ivanovs), and in any case nuclear 
weapons cost less than soldiers. This spares leaders the task of whipping up support 
for high military spending, and makes nuclear states less prone to hypernationalism.
14
 
On such grounds some optimists advocate limited proliferation.
15
  
BARRING RADICAL CHANGE, CATASTROPHIC WAR IS JUST A MATTER 
OF TIME 
Most critics of the nuclear peace thesis have sought to show that war is more 
likely than the optimists claim. But even if nuclear deterrence makes war very 
unlikely, it is a good bargain only if the risk of nuclear war is so low that it is worth 
running to prevent another World War I or II.
16
 Since the first time deterrence failed 
could be the last, this is a high hurdle for it to clear.
17
 At times Waltz seems to have 
trouble seeing how war could break out at all. Nevertheless, even he admits that 
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nuclear deterrence can fail.
18
 Fierce leaders may be willing to pay high costs. While 
only a fanatic would choose a nuclear war, we know from the Cold War that others 
will risk it. Since nuclear brinksmanship inevitably entails a danger that things may 
get out of control, states in a crisis can stumble into war.
19
 Indeed, evidence from the 
Cold War shows that we were lucky not to blunder into it.
20
 
How low is the risk of major war among nuclear states? Waltz claims that it 
“approaches zero.”21 But here “approaches” is not good enough. So long as the risk of 
nuclear war does not steadily decrease, if we wait long enough it becomes a near 
certainty.
22
 Some events—such as monkeys typing Hamlet by striking keys at 
random—are so unlikely that we can effectively treat them as impossible. Even over 
eons the chances are tiny that they will ever occur.
23
 Nuclear war does not fall into 
this category. In the six decades since the atomic bomb was invented, we have already 
seen one nuclear war (though a small and one-sided one), a superpower crisis in 
which President Kennedy estimated the risk of war at between one in three and one in 
two,
24
 and several other scares and confrontations in which the risk of war was small 
but not negligible. While we can only guess at the statistical probability, an estimate 
of one percent per year during the Cold War does not seem outlandish. By 1989 it was 
probably less,
25
 while at points, such as the Berlin and Cuban crises, it was surely 
higher. At a rate of one percent, the risk exceeds fifty percent after sixty-nine years.
26
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Today, the risk that the United States or Russia will deliberately start a nuclear war 
has fallen, but with the erosion of Russian command and control, the risk of 
accidental war may actually have risen. “Given the exceedingly short reaction time 
that is available to decision-makers,” T. V. Paul observes, “there is all the more 
reason to worry about a 1914 scenario of misjudgments, miscalculations and strategic 
fatalism occurring in the future….”27   
Moreover, we may well be in the lull between storms. Nuclear rivalries and 
arms races are likely to resume. Under multipolarity, the risk may be greater than 
before.
28
 Washington and Beijing may manage their rivalry as successfully as did 
Washington and Moscow, but we should not bank on it. Moreover, the greater the 
number of nuclear states, the bigger the risk that one will start war by accident or fall 
under the control of a madman.29 Even if new nuclear states handle their weapons no 
worse than did the superpowers, can we assume they will do better?
30
 Poor states have 
strong incentives not to build as many weapons as did the Soviet Union and the 
United States,
31
 but this may not be true for China, India, or other new superpowers. 
At several points during the Cuban missile crisis, things could have gone badly 
wrong.
32
 When those states have their Cuban crises, will they be as lucky each time? 
Sooner or later the cards will fall against us, and with enough time, in a big way.  
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Waltz mocks such calculations, pointing out that in 1960 C. P. Snow claimed 
it was a “statistical fact” that nuclear weapons would be used in the next ten years. 
“Apparently,” Waltz scoffs, “fifty-some years is not a long enough run to confirm the 
stability of nuclear deterrence.”33  Indeed, it is not. A few decades of uneasy peace are 
far too short a time to show the probability of nuclear war at all. Was the risk over the 
last half century forty percent, or was it merely fifteen? We have no way to tell.
34
 
Even if nuclear deterrence is like Russian roulette, Joseph Nye argues, there is a great 
difference between games when the pistol has six chambers and when it has a 
hundred.
35
 That is true—if one plays only a few times. Nuclear deterrence, however, 
is Russian roulette played every day for decades. Even if relations among the nuclear 
powers are good, on any day of the year there is some chance of nuclear war, as 
Russia‟s 1995 activation of its “nuclear suitcases” showed.36 The risk of being “shot” 
need not rise over time. Still, one cannot play Russian roulette indefinitely. Seen from 
the perspective of a human lifespan, whether a pistol goes off within a few days or a 
few weeks makes little difference. Similarly, whether large-scale nuclear war comes 
next year or in two centuries matters little over the long haul of the earth‟s history, 
though it makes a difference to us.  
Barring revolutionary changes in technology or the states system, if we keep 
nuclear weapons for hundreds or thousands of years, they are going to be used—by 
accident or design. We may have colonized nearby planets by then, or other changes 
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may have made nuclear weapons irrelevant.
37
 Or they may not. Arguing in favor of 
missile defense, William Safire claims that “hitting a bullet with a bullet is hard to 
do,” but “[i]n time, after costly trial and error, the new defense will surely leapfrog the 
old offense, as it always does.”38 Always? In the five hundred years since small arms 
appeared, nobody has discovered how to shoot down a bullet. Why assume that 
missile defense—or any other technical solution—will be more successful? Some 
innovations are not easily neutralized, and nuclear weapons may be one of them. 
Richard Garwin has noted that if we start with an annual risk of nuclear war of one 
percent, and can reduce it by 20 percent each year, the total risk for all time will 
amount to under five percent. This leads Nye to conclude that “[i]f we can continually 
reduce probabilities [of nuclear war], failure is not inevitable in any meaningful time 
frame.”39 But aspiring to reduce the risk of nuclear war by twenty percent every year 
is optimistic even for a liberal. For realists, while the risk of war may vary, there is no 
reason to think it will steadily decline at all.
40
 Nuclear weapons would have posed a 
serious threat to humanity any time in the past three thousand years.  
Given that realists believe that conflict is a fact of life and are skeptical of 
quick fixes to enduring international problems, it is odd that many are so sanguine 
about nuclear weapons.
41
 Keith Payne, for example, attacks abolitionists for 
combining pessimism about the prospects for war with faith that disarmament is 
possible.
42
 He has a point, but the argument can be turned around: Why think that 
disarmament will fail, but that deterrence is likely to succeed indefinitely?
43
 Surely 
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realists should conclude that both pessimistic views are justified. Is anything more 
utopian (or despairing) than a British official‟s remark that “we've got to try and make 
stable deterrence work for the rest of history”?44 “[S]imple statistical probability,” 
Campbell Craig observes,  
shows that the continuation of anarchy and of nuclear deterrence will 
sooner or later result in war, thermonuclear war. In the long term 
deterrence is bound to fail: to predict that it will succeed forever, never 
once collapsing into a nuclear war, is to engage in a utopian and 
ahistorical kind of thinking totally contrary to traditional Realist 
philosophy, as well as to defy the irrefutable logic of infinite probability.
45
  
 
There are good realist reasons to think we may be stuck with nuclear weapons 
whether we like it or not. But we should not like it. Realism is a tragic philosophy, not 
a Panglossian one. Handed lemons, realists should not make lemonade. 
The outlook is certainly bleak. Human casualties from an all-out nuclear war 
between NATO and Russia could be in the hundreds of millions or billions. At worst, 
the smoke from burning cities and oil facilities could plunge the earth into chilly 
darkness, though some claim that predictions of “nuclear winter” are overblown. The 
environment would remain poisoned for thousands of years.
46
 Waltz argues that if 
nuclear war breaks out, no state is likely to escalate it to apocalyptic levels, and that if 
weak states acquire and use nuclear weapons, “the world will not end.”47 He is 
probably right—about the first nuclear war. But unless a nuclear exchange 
revolutionizes world politics, states will remain in competition. A small nuclear war 
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might provide the swift kick needed to get states to accept world government or other 
radical reforms,
48
 but this seems unlikely. Even if it did not teach states that nuclear 
weapons were usable,
49
 the brutality and resulting bitterness would more likely make 
their relations Hobbesian. What country would join a federation with a state that had 
just destroyed two of its cities?  Eventually—in the second, third, or twenty-eighth 
nuclear war—fanatics, fools or leaders fearing pre-emption will be at the helm, and 
use large numbers of hydrogen bombs.  
NO HARMONY OF INTERESTS 
“It is true that nuclear weapons, very attractive as a deterrent, begin to look 
awfully unattractive when the focus shifts to war fighting,” says Mearsheimer. 
“…This is a Faustian bargain, attractive only because the alternative—a reasonable 
chance of destructive great power conventional war—seems worse.”50 Worse for 
whom? Who gains from this bargain, and who loses? If the optimists are right, nuclear 
weapons give the inhabitants of nuclear states a better chance of dying in bed. True, 
when major thermonuclear war breaks out, many or most will be killed, but that is 
unlikely to happen in our lifetimes, or even in our grandchildren‟s.  These benefits are 
not evenly shared out. Non-aligned states face the side effects of nuclear war—which 
could be huge
51—without the gains.52  Wild animals, who are more likely to suffer 
from nuclear than conventional war, also get the short end of the stick.  
Notably, nuclear deterrence discriminates among generations.  Nuclear 
deterrence, however stabilizing, is not foolproof. Stephen Van Evera argues that 
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proliferation would be “a net benefit to peace in Europe,”53 but acknowledges that 
MAD “becomes a nightmare if nondeterrable nuclear actors appear.” A nuclear world 
with the likes of Hitler would be still more dangerous than a conventional one. He 
takes comfort in the thought that “[t]his danger is not at the world‟s doorstep.”54 But 
sooner or later, unless the world has been transformed, new Hitlers will appear. 
Proliferation might be a net benefit over the next fifty years, but not the next five 
hundred. Nuclear optimists falsely assume an intergenerational harmony of interests. 
If they are right, we all gain from deterrence until it breaks down. But it will break 
down. To stop worrying and love the bomb means to doom our descendants, to save 
our own miserable hides. 
Intergenerational Exploitation 
Nuclear deterrence thus raises issues of intergenerational justice. 
Intergenerational justice deals with our obligations to past or future generations, 
particularly those with which our own lives do not overlap.
55
 Certain actions—such as 
cutting down forests or producing radioactive waste—let us make gains at our 
descendants‟ expense. Tax cuts now, debt repayment later can be a winning formula 
for re-election, as recent U.S. history shows. “In many intergenerational situations...it 
is less costly in the short term to ignore the problem,” observes Kimberly Wade-
Benzoni. “…In the long run, however, it ends up costing more—but those costs 
accrue to a different set of people.”56 Intergenerational exploitation is particularly 
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common in the environmental sphere. Nuclear power raises many of the same 
distributive issues as nuclear deterrence. We enjoy the electricity now; future 
generations face most of the risks. We exploit our descendants by creating an 
externality in our favor, since “future generations must bear very significant costs 
without having received the benefits of the activities prior to the accident.”57 So too 
with nuclear deterrence. The objection that “no reasonable person with even a limited 
acquaintance with the history of human affairs over the last 3,000 years could be 
confident of safe storage by methods involving human intervention over the enormous 
time periods involved”58 applies at least as much to nuclear weapons as to nuclear 
waste. Does any reasonable person, let alone a realist, expect deterrence to work for 
millennia without catastrophic “accidents”? 
Many of us feel intuitively that to squander resources or hand down heaps of 
radioactive waste to future generations is wrong.
59
 Such intuitions draw support from 
three ethical standpoints: contractarianism, distributive justice and utilitarianism.
60
 
SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 
John Rawls argued that those institutions are just which rational egoists would 
choose if they were ignorant of the position in society they would occupy. If such 
                                                          
57
 Brian Barry, “Intergenerational Justice in Energy Policy,” in MacLean and Brown, Energy and the 
Future, 29; Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations, quotation at 5. On the externalization of costs to 
future generations, see Birnbacher, Verantwortung für zukünftige Generationen, 247-48, n. 71. 
58
 R. Routley and V. Routley, “Nuclear Energy and Obligations to the Future,” Inquiry 21, no. 2 
(Summer 1978): 136. 
59
 I set aside the question of whether nuclear power may harm future generations less than continuing to 
devour fossil fuels. 
60
 Some critics may invoke what Derek Parfit (Reasons and Persons, chapter 16) calls the non-identity 
problem. Nearly any major public policy affects who is born and who is not.  If we rely on nuclear 
weapons, different people will be born than if we had relied on conventional deterrence instead. Hence, 
even if this leads to disaster, so long as postwar people find their lives even minimally worth living, we 
will not be able to identify specific individuals whom they have harmed. Philosophers have suggested a 
variety of responses to the non-identity problem. But perhaps the best response is that it violates our 
basic moral intuitions. It means, for example, that squandering resources harms no one in the far future, 
since different people will be born than if we conserve. Such claims, as Parfit himself says (Reasons 
and Persons, 378) are scarcely plausible. In any case, for the non-identity problem to apply, future 
people must find life worth living. If their lives are wretched—as could well be the case after nuclear 
war—they could blame us for creating the conditions for them to be born at all. 
 15 
egoists were to choose a rule which they wished all previous generations to have 
followed, it would be in their interest to avoid intergenerational exploitation.
61
 If we 
did not know whether we would be born in 1960, 2400 or 3700, surely we would not 
agree to our present squandering of fossil fuels that is heating up the planet. The risk 
of being born into a later generation would be too great. Nor would we agree to rely 
on thousands of nuclear weapons that may leave, by 3700, little planet to inherit. This 
is all the more true because the benefits of nuclear deterrence may last for only a 
century or two before it breaks down, while a nuclear war‟s survivors will have to 
deal with the consequences for thousands of years. Even if we assume that the earth‟s 
population would be much smaller after a war, the odds of being born into a post-
holocaust generation would be high indeed.  
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
We can also appeal to the principle of distributive justice. Future generations 
deserve as good opportunities as we have had, and this includes a livable planet.
62
 It 
also means the right to inherit what past generations have built up. It is true that past 
people were under no obligation to write Crime and Punishment or build the Library 
of Congress, and in that sense we have no right to inherit them.
63
 But since they did 
create those goods, future generations have the same right to enjoy them as we did. In 
one sense, I do not deserve to inherit a family fortune that I have not lifted a finger to 
earn. Still, if my father hocks the family heirlooms and squanders the money on 
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champagne and caviar, he wrongs me as well as our ancestors.
64
 Likewise, we hold 
the planet in trust for future generations as well as our own.
65
  
Critics will object that mere existence is not the only thing worth handing 
down. Nuclear deterrence may protect other parts of the human heritage, such as free 
political institutions. “If we have benefited from „life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness,‟” Nye asks, “why should we assume that the next generation would want 
only life?” After all, we take a risk every time we get into a car.66 But this confuses 
threats to individuals with threats to the environment. If I expect to live another fifty 
years, risking a car accident is a reasonable cost-benefit calculation. If the greenhouse 
effect threatens the future of life on earth, the calculus of driving becomes very 
different. So too with nuclear weapons. However desirable it may be to preserve the 
better aspects of our civilization for future generations, this pales against the 
obligation to preserve the natural world and favorable conditions for life on it, 
because they can last for so much longer. “If we do not soon destroy ourselves, but 
instead survive for a typical lifetime of a successful species,” note Carl Sagan and 
Richard Turco, “there will be humans for another 10 million years or so. Assuming 
that our lifespan and numbers do not much grow over that period, the cumulative 
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human population—all of us who have ever lived—would then reach the startling 
total of about a quadrillion (a 1 followed by 15 zeros).”67 And this is just one species. 
Vertebrate animals have been around for some half a billion years; human beings for 
tens of thousands; sedentary civilizations for a few millennia, and the ideals of the 
Founding Fathers for about three centuries.  
Barring catastrophe, sentient life, even human beings, will outlast Locke and 
Jefferson by a tidy few millennia. Past generations have thought their ideals worth 
preserving, but we would not want them to have put the planet at risk to do so. 
Suppose that nuclear weapons had been discovered in the twelfth century. Would the 
Crusaders have had the right to risk nuclear holocaust to save Christian Jerusalem 
from the Saracens? Would we countenance nuclear brinksmanship by Philip II in the 
name of the Counterreformation? As Barrie Paskins says, “Who are we, beings with a 
life expectancy of decades, to discuss the entire future of the planet in terms deriving 
exclusively from our concerns, concerns which may be expected to count for nothing 
in a few millennia with or without nuclear war?”68  
Some will claim that this argument allows the future to tyrannize over the 
present.
69
 Theories of distributive justice, however, may establish limits on what we 
owe.
70
 We need not live in slums so that our grandchildren can live in palaces, 
because this would mean extreme and avoidable inequality. Nuclear deterrence, 
conversely, is in the long run almost sure to leave many future people worse off than 
we are. Any progress the future brings will be cancelled out by a major thermonuclear 
war—to say nothing of the calculus for non-human animals. Nuclear deterrence thus 
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violates the principle that we should “leave „as much and as good‟ of the public goods 
previous generations have bequeathed” 71 —such as a nonradioactive landscape—as 
we have enjoyed ourselves.  
UTILITARIANISM 
Nuclear deterrence is also incompatible with total utilitarianism, which says 
we should want the greatest good for the greatest number.
72
 Whatever benefits we 
presently draw from deterrence will be outweighed by centuries or millennia of 
suffering after it breaks down. Average utilitarianism, in contrast, says we should 
maximize the welfare of however many beings exist. If war killed everybody, average 
utility might remain fairly high. We would enjoy the blessings of deterrence until war 
broke out, and after that we would all be dead. But research in the 1990s indicated 
that even catastrophic war should not kill everyone,
73
  and so long as some people or 
sentient animals survive a holocaust, nuclear deterrence will also reduce average 
utility. In any case, if nuclear war should drive us extinct, this is hardly a moral 
argument in its favor. 
If only a single generation—call it generation H—stood to suffer from nuclear 
war, we might defend deterrence on contractarian or utilitarian grounds. Each 
generation, contractarians might claim, makes the Faustian bargain, and if war comes 
along on its watch, tough luck. Utilitarians might hope that the benefits that preceding 
generations A-G enjoyed from the nuclear peace would outweigh the suffering of 
generation H. But a nuclear war would penalize not only the generation that drew the 
short straw, but all generations that lived after it. We take a small risk of a nuclear 
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conflict, and enjoy a low risk of conventional war. Wartime generation H enjoys the 
benefits of nuclear deterrence until it breaks down. But its descendants are left picking 
up the pieces. Here, if the optimists are right, is where the exploitation comes in. 
Should the first few wars remain limited, their survivors may continue to benefit from 
the lower incidence of war nuclear weapons provide. But as wars recur the costs of 
deterrence will mount compared to its benefits, and those benefits will be wiped out 
almost completely when at last the “big one” arrives. 
COSMOPOLITAN VS. NATIONALIST ETHICS 
The foregoing analysis has been cast in terms of what is right for the world. 
Many realists argue in just this way. Urging states to pursue their selfish interests, 
they often justify doing so through cosmopolitan arguments.
74
 Waltz, for example, 
defends horizontal proliferation in terms of its effects on the system. Yet some may 
say that a state‟s primary duty is not to the world, but to its own citizens. 75 This rests 
on the observation that government involves a fiduciary relationship.
76
 Leaders, one 
might argue, have no more right to endanger their country‟s interests than trustees 
have to donate the money entrusted to them to UNICEF. Even if one accepts this view 
of trusteeship,
77
 it does not follow that they should protect their citizens at other 
countries‟ expense. Though trustees bear an obligation to protect their charge‟s 
interests, this does not mean they can do anything they please to innocent bystanders. 
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While it may be wrong to give Tommy‟s trust fund to charity, it would also be wrong 
to enlarge the fund by embezzling money from Tina‟s. Similarly, it may be wrong for 
states to increase their security through nuclear deterrence at the expense of neutral 
third parties or future generations.  
Let us suppose, however, that leaders do have the right to harm other countries 
in the interest of their own citizens. Do nuclear weapons help them to do this? A state 
might increase its citizens‟ security by acquiring a nuclear monopoly. But such a 
monopoly is unlikely to last. Historically, one state‟s acquisition has often led its 
rivals to follow suit.
78
 What if a state‟s rival is going nuclear? Here leaders have often 
believed that the best way to protect national security is to nuclearize in response. 
This may be true in the short term. But in most cases, conventional defense or even 
surrender would be a better way to ensure long-term national security. An enemy is 
most unlikely to launch a full-scale nuclear attack against a non-nuclear state, though 
it might use a few weapons for coercion. If only State A has nuclear weapons, it has 
little incentive to pre-empt in a crisis, and State B cannot pre-empt.
79
 Nor is a limited 
nuclear war as likely to get out of control, because there is no risk of reciprocal 
escalation. While nuclear deterrence may save the next few generations from being 
red, it increases distant generations‟ chance of being dead, and that is not in the long-
term national interest.
80
 Even ethical theories that privilege national interests are very 
unlikely to demand nuclear deterrence, once future generations are factored in.  
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Confronted with a foreign adversary, states ought, in principle, either to rely 
on conventional defense, or to surrender. If nuclear weapons are readily available, 
however, the latter is too much to ask. As David Lewis observes, even if surrender is 
the best of all choices, if a leader is not confident she could choose it, it may be 
unwise to try. Pakistan ought to give up its nuclear weapons in the interest of future 
generations, and in a war with India, it should accept defeat rather than rebuild them. 
But surely it would not—and if Pakistan scrambled to re-arm during a crisis, that 
might make nuclear war more likely. If this is so, wrong as it is to rely on nuclear 
deterrence, this is a case where, in Lewis‟s words, “it is best to intend the second 
best.”81 As we shall see, that second-best is minimum deterrence. 
What Is To Be Done? 
Nuclear deterrence, if the optimists are right, buys today‟s inhabitants of 
nuclear states a better chance of a ripe old age. It buys future generations rubble. If the 
optimists are wrong, the bargain looks still worse. Even if apocalyptic war is not 
inevitable, we should do all we can to avert it. “Where there is any risk of something 
infinitely awful happening,” Robert Goodin remarks, “then probabilities simply do 
not matter. Just so long as that outcome is possible...we must do whatever we can to 
avoid it. Infinite costs, discounted by any probability larger than zero, are still 
infinite.”82 Certainly, if catastrophic war is even likely, the Faustian bargain is a bad 
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one indeed. But barring major technological or political changes, in the long-run total 
war is all but inevitable—if not the first nuclear war, then the tenth or twentieth. 
Jacques Chirac asserts that “[o]ur [nuclear] deterrent guarantees…that France's 
survival will never be placed into question by a major military power.”83 Never? 
There is no security from long-term thermonuclear catastrophe. 
In this devil‟s bargain the archfiends are Russia and the United States, though 
other states may have forces big enough to threaten global disaster.
84
 “States with 
large arsenals and faulty bureaucratic routines may accidentally fire warheads in large 
numbers,” Waltz concedes, before adding, “States with small arsenals cannot do so.... 
Efforts should concentrate more on making large arsenals safe and less on keeping 
weak states from obtaining the small number of warheads they may understandably 
believe they need for security.”85 Waltz is right. But while only the great powers hold 
humanity hostage, China, India and Pakistan are still buying security at their own 
descendants‟ expense. “[W]e ought to be disturbed by the apparently permanent 
position of nuclear weapons in the international system, even acknowledging that 
there is now little that can be done about it,” Lawrence Freedman wrote in 1989. “To 
believe that this can go on indefinitely without major disaster requires an optimism 
unjustified by any historical or political perspective.”86 
Is there anything we can do about it? Mutual assured destruction may buy us 
security, but by mortgaging the future of untold future generations. We ought to prefer 
any policy that reduces the long-run threat to the world, even if it makes war more 
likely in the here and now. In principle, this can be done in two ways: by renouncing 
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nuclear deterrence altogether, or by developing a form that externalizes fewer costs to 
future people, even if we internalize more ourselves. The first is morally preferable to 
the second, but is open—at least for the most part—only to non-nuclear states. 
NON-NUCLEAR STATES SHOULD RENOUNCE THE BOMB 
States that have not already developed the bomb should not do so. Indeed, 
given the threat that it poses to future people, they should not even if this makes them 
more likely to be blackmailed or conquered.
87
 People five hundred years from now 
will not much care who ran the country in the twenty-first century or whether it 
retained a particular province, whereas if they have to live in ruined and radioactive 
cities, they may care very much indeed. States need not become pacifists, but they 
should restrict their defense to conventional means. North Korea has mounted a strong 
deterrent even without nuclear weapons. Rather than threaten the Middle East with a 
nuclear arms race, Iran could follow Libya‟s example and appease the United States. 
Rather than doom many generations of South Asians to disaster, India and Pakistan 
should have relied on conventional weapons or relinquished Kashmir. Of course some 
countries will refuse to run such risks or make such sacrifices. But they do so at the 
expense of their own descendants. 
RELIABLE DISARMAMENT IS NOT POSSIBLE 
Whether states that already have nuclear weapons—including new arrivals 
such as India and Pakistan—should give them up is another matter. Even if nuclear 
states agreed to disarm, they might seek to rearm in a crisis. Whether conventional 
arsenals would be enough to deter a cheater from using nuclear weapons
88
 is hard to 
judge. While a denuclearized world would have strong incentives to punish 
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proliferation,
89
 faced with a great power‟s cheating or rearmament, states would more 
probably themselves rearm than to go to war to stop it. States in a rearmament race 
would likely have haphazard command and control, and a state that thought it had a 
lead might launch a preventive war. Nuclear disarmament could thus make nuclear 
war more likely rather than less.
90
  
. As Charles Glaser notes, this is not an argument for proliferation by "[n]on-
nuclear states that cannot build nuclear weapons...within the timespan of a reasonably 
long conventional war.”91 Nor would it forbid disarmament if states are unable to re-
arm quickly.
92
 In that case they should give up the bomb for the same reasons that 
non-nuclear states should not build it in the first place. Nevertheless, we could 
scarcely be confident that states could not rearm quickly in a crisis, particularly if they 
had concealed weapons or secretly continued research. The race between America and 
Nazi Germany to invent the bomb is not an encouraging precedent. For the 
foreseeable future, nuclear states seem stuck with the Faustian bargain. In this case, it 
is only fair for them to pay a larger share of the costs. 
MINIMUM DETERRENCE 
An ideal form of deterrence would target the inhabitants of Washington and 
Moscow, without endangering third party countries, wild animals, the Library of 
Congress or the future of the species.  One might seek to achieve this, for example, by 
replacing present arsenals with enhanced radiation weapons aimed at cities. The 
neutron bomb is often accused of “destroying people, not property,” but from an 
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international and intergenerational perspective this would be its greatest virtue. 
Americans and Russians would die in a war, but Brazilians, bears and St. Basil‟s 
Cathedral would be spared. Unfortunately, relying on ERW will not work. Even 
neutron bombs, according to Carl Sagan, could start large fires which could contribute 
to nuclear winter.
93
 In any case, cellars a few feet below ground could protect 
civilians from radiation.
94
 Once simple measures of civil defense were adopted, ERW 
would no longer be a MAD deterrent. 
Some analysts propose targeting military forces rather than cities, both to 
spare civilians, and also because it would be less likely to bring on nuclear winter. 
While targeting an enemy‟s nuclear forces could prove destabilizing, attacking 
conventional targets need not be.
95
 But no such agreement  could be verified. Missiles 
can be retargeted within seconds. Even if leaders did not aim at cities and oilfields on 
purpose, in the fog of war they might strike some by accident. Or they might change 
their minds in the course of the war and escalate to attacking cities. Without deep cuts, 
a “counterpower” strategy still entails the risk of catastrophe.96 A force comprised 
solely of many accurate but very low-yield warheads might limit damage, but could 
still cause large fires, and the warheads‟ yield could be hard to verify.97 Missile 
defenses, if they could be made to work, would avert the risks nuclear weapons pose 
both to present and future generations. Yet they face huge technical obstacles,
98
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any case, so long as there is no defense against such weapons as cruise missiles, cities 
can still burn, and nuclear winter remains a risk.
99
  Combined with ambitious arms 
control, missile defenses could reduce the nuclear threat .
100
 But without such 
measures, they are more likely to prove destabilizing. Similarly, reductions in 
warhead yield or a counterpower strategy could add security if accompanied with 
deep cuts in nuclear arsenals.
101
 But to rely on adoption of a counterpower strategy or 
on mini-nukes alone depends too much on states‟ good faith and rationality. Given the 
potentially catastrophic consequences if states should break the agreement, this is not 
a risk we ought to run. 
Deterrence at very low numbers of nuclear weapons seems more promising. 
Disarmament does have two big advantages. It would limit the number of nuclear 
powers, even if states broke out of an agreement.
102
 And while a re-armament race 
could make nuclear war more likely, states would probably fight before both had 
achieved secure second-strike deterrents—and thus with small numbers of 
weapons.
103
 But if disarmament led to rearmament and a limited nuclear war, things 
would not stop there. The survivors would most likely build large arsenals, and we 
would be back where we started, minus a handful of cities, a few million people, and 
any willingness to pursue either disarmament or minimum deterrence in the future.
104
 
Disarmament could thus increase the risk of catastrophe. Minimum deterrence lacks 
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disarmament‟s advantage of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. But the risk of 
war would be lower, and thus in the long term states would be more likely to keep 
arsenals small enough to limit damage.
105
 It is the more sustainable policy. 
HOW MANY IS THE MINIMUM? 
For damage reduction to be meaningful, nuclear arsenals would have to be 
small indeed. Even most of minimum deterrence‟s advocates have seen it as requiring 
hundreds if not thousands of warheads.
106
 The logic of nuclear optimism, however, 
implies that we could go much lower. Waltz notes Bernard Brodie‟s statement that the 
USSR could be deterred with a single hydrogen bomb that could and would reliably 
be used on Moscow: “I would change that sentence by substituting „might‟ for 
„would,‟” he remarks, “and by adding that the threat of a fission bomb or two would 
also do the trick.”107 Five warheads could wreck the Boston-Washington or San 
Diego-San Francisco corridors. Fifteen warheads could kill as many Russians as died 
in all of World War II.
 108
 As Stansfield Turner observes, to deter the Russians 
“probably takes the same number as it does to deter the United States—one. But let us 
play it safe. Call it five or ten, or some such number—still, it will not be in the 
hundreds or thousands.”109 We may need a few more weapons to ensure that some 
will survive and get through—but not more than a few. Even the chance that a couple 
of weapons might get through should deter attack.
110
  “To locate virtually all missiles 
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and aircraft is not good enough,” Waltz observes. “...What political-military objective 
is worth risking Vladivostok, Novosibirsk, and Tomsk, with no way of being sure that 
Moscow would not go as well?”111 A state run by zealots or lunatics may not be 
deterred, but fanatics are likely to be undeterrable anyway.
112
 
Are states actually this cost- and risk- averse? Roger Barnett points out that 
Germany and Japan fought on through World War II despite devastating bombing 
raids, and that Iraq tolerated massive deaths from international sanctions.
113
 The 
relevant questions, however, are whether German and Japanese leaders would have 
initiated war in 1941 knowing that they could lose half a dozen of their biggest cities, 
and whether Saddam Hussein would have risked provoking a nuclear strike on 
Baghdad.
114
 Moreover, supposing that they were willing to run such risks, is there 
reason to think a larger deterrent would have changed their minds? Barnett cites 
Muammar al-Qaddafi‟s claim that he would have struck New York in response to the 
bombing of Libya as evidence that leaders will accept huge losses. But if the Libyan 
dictator‟s words were anything more than bravado, they suggest that size does not 
matter, since he claimed to be willing to attack a state with a huge nuclear arsenal.  
A stronger challenge comes from Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, who point out 
that as late as the 1960s U.S. officials seriously contemplated nuclear war against the 
Soviet Union. They argue that the mere possibility that the opponent will be able to 
retaliate may not be enough to deter a first strike. The Eisenhower Administration‟s 
strategy of “massive retaliation,” they note, envisioned nuclear strikes in response to a 
Soviet invasion of Western Europe, and President Kennedy made inquiries about the 
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possibility of a disarming strike on the USSR.
115
 It has long been well-known, 
however, that U.S. officials made plans for the first use of nuclear weapons. They 
thought such plans necessary if the United States was to have a credible deterrent. The 
key question is whether they would ever have acted on them when they knew that an 
hour later nuclear weapons could be falling on Washington. Whether leaders will 
gamble on disarming the opponent if the odds seem good enough is, as Lieber and 
Press say, an empirical matter, and deserves further investigation.
116
  
In any case, a minimum deterrent need not be vulnerable. Some see the risk 
that one side would cheat on arms agreements as a barrier to very deep cuts.
117
 But 
strategically speaking, it is hard to see why cheating would matter unless a state 
thought it could destroy all the opponent‟s warheads.118 China has made the most out 
of its arsenal by separating its missiles into small units.
119
 Any advanced industrial 
power could ensure survivability by fielding multiple submarines, each armed with 
one or two warheads.
120
 We can never be positive that force levels do not matter, but 
maintaining arsenals that threaten to wreck the world has its risks as well. 
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Carl Kaysen, Robert McNamara and George Rathjens argue that “forces of a 
size and structure that would permit the destruction of, say, a dozen or a few tens 
rather than hundreds or thousands of targets in a retaliatory attack” should be as good 
deterrents as larger forces.
121
 Harold Feiveson and his colleagues recommend a 
minimum deterrent of 200 warheads, though they observe that this “could nearly as 
easily be 400 or 100.”122 While war with 200 warheads each could still make World 
Wars I and II look like tussles in a sandbox, Sagan and Turco conclude that it would 
risk far less serious climatic consequences.
123
 This creates a strong presumption in 
favor of deterrence at these levels, while continuing to explore the possibility of going 
still lower. Ironically, this is an agenda to which many nuclear optimists would agree. 
WILL DEEP CUTS ENCOURAGE PROLIFERATION? 
Critics of minimum deterrence have also argued that it could encourage 
nuclear proliferation. If deep cuts required nuclear states to resume testing, this might 
indeed complicate non-proliferation efforts.
124
 If the United States and Russia can test, 
states might ask, why shouldn‟t we? But minimum deterrence should not require the 
resumption of testing. When many American experts testify that the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program ensures the US deterrent‟s reliability, what enemy would be 
crazy enough to gamble? As Rajesh Basrur points out, “[t]he adversary cannot assume 
that a risk is worth taking because the deterrer's weapons might not work. The 
potential consequences are not worth the risk.”125 Criticisms of the Comprehensive 
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Test Ban on this ground have an air of unreality. As Senator John Kerry remarked 
during the CTBT debate: 
If you were offered the option 10 years from now or 20 years from now 
with our current mechanisms and verification capacities to take 20, 
30…warheads out of our entire arsenal and we offered you the option of 
dropping them on North Carolina or Virginia, I guarantee you you would 
say please do not do that because you know as well as I do the better 
percentage of them are going to go off, if not all of them….[Deterrence] 
is built on somebody‟s supposition that something might happen.126 
  
Some worry that minimum deterrence could encourage non-nuclear states to 
compete with Russia and the United States.
127
 But on the dominant model of nuclear 
proliferation, which holds that states acquire nuclear weapons in reaction to external 
threats, it is hard to see why the size of the Russian and American arsenals should 
matter.
128
 Security-seeking proliferators, if they worry about survivability, will ask 
whether they can build a second-strike deterrent. A preventive or preemptive US 
strike would involve small numbers of warheads, if nuclear weapons were used at all. 
A rational security-seeker contemplating proliferation will thus not care whether the 
great powers have three hundred or three thousand warheads.
129
 If, on the other hand, 
states seek nuclear weapons as a source of prestige, minimum deterrence might make 
proliferation more attractive by allowing small states to have as many as the great 
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powers. But by signaling that nuclear weapons are bad and that the powers were 
trying to kick the habit, it could also discourage proliferation.
130
 
Critics of minimum deterrence also argue that it could promote proliferation 
among America‟s allies. These might fear that Washington would not use a small 
arsenal unless the U.S. homeland came under attack.
131
 In fact it is hard to imagine 
any aggressor so reckless as to gamble on this assumption, given the cost of being 
wrong. Still, worst-case thinking might lead Germany, Japan, Taiwan or others to 
nuclearize. That would be too bad. The more states with nuclear weapons, the more 
chances that they will be used. In at least one case—Taiwan—proliferation could also 
lead to preventive war. Still, we should prefer a world with a higher risk of war but a 
lower risk of apocalyptic destruction. In such a world we pay more of the costs of our 
defense, and externalize fewer to future generations. 
Some disarmament advocates argue that only the complete abolition of nuclear 
weapons can delegitimate their acquisition. They believe that continued reliance on 
nuclear deterrence—even at low levels—will ensure proliferation. But while a “low 
salience nuclear world” of few nuclear powers with minimum deterrents may not be 
sustainable,
132
 a world of many small nuclear powers might be. If states accept the 
logic of minimum deterrence, they should not depart from this equilibrium. What 
would either an aggressor or a defender gain from an arms build-up? While such a 
world would not be ideal, it would be better than the status quo—and more likely to 
be a stable solution than a premature attempt at nuclear disarmament. 
In any case, for now, steps toward minimum deterrence are also steps toward 
disarmament. So long as the latter remains our ultimate objective, deep cuts can only 
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help legitimate the nuclear non-proliferation regime. As Ken Booth and Nicholas 
Wheeler observe, “[b]ecause we do not yet know how to get rid of the last few 
hundred warheads...is not a sufficient reason for not going in that direction.”133  
What if Realists are Wrong? 
Neorealists—who make up the majority of the nuclear optimists—believe we 
are doomed to perpetual conflict. On their logic, the worst that could happen if 
minimum deterrence proves less stable will be a small nuclear war—still better than 
the large nuclear war that we can expect at present. Liberals, Marxists and 
constructivists, on the other hand, may argue that the best way to escape nuclear 
deterrence altogether is to change the character of international politics.
134
 This raises 
a potential objection to my argument. Perhaps today‟s apparently fairly stable form of 
deterrence is just what we need for peace-inducing phenomena such as 
democratization, economic interdependence and integration to take hold. Kenneth 
Oye, for example, holds that the prolonged superpower standoff of the Cold War led 
to the Soviet Union‟s liberalization.135 A premature attempt at minimum deterrence 
could interrupt long-term peace-inducing processes,
136
 harming future generations as 
well as ourselves. 
This objection should be taken seriously. However, if Russia and the United 
States should appeal to hopes for long term progress toward peace to justify their huge 
arsenals, they ought to be working much harder to bring it about. Democratic peace 
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theory is the single most powerful liberal theory of peace. Many liberals agreed that it 
was vital for international peace that Russia make a successful transition to liberal 
democracy, but US spending on direct democracy assistance after the Cold War was 
paltry, amounting to $16 million in fiscal year 2000 for all of Russia. This was 
transparently “assistance on the cheap.”137 Nor, of course, has Russia itself done 
better: The Putin government‟s failure to promote democracy requires no 
commentary. One way or another, Washington and Moscow are falling down on their 
obligations—either to make deep cuts now, or to create conditions for future 
disarmament. 
Moreover, the possibility of radical change in international relations suggests 
that Britain and France have reason to consider nuclear disarmament. If the norms 
model of nuclear proliferation is right, it could set a good example, discouraging the 
spread of nuclear weapons around the world.
138
 True, if major change does not occur, 
London and Paris will someday face an confrontation in which they will be tempted to 
rearm. If they do so before being defeated, this could mean nuclear war. But for 
Britain and France the risk seems remote. It is hard even to guess with what rival that 
crisis would be. Over the next century the spread of democracy, international 
integration or other change may transform international relations before a 
confrontation involving either state recurs. This strengthens the case for these two 
states taking a chance on nuclear disarmament. The non-proliferation benefits may 
outweigh the risk that rearmament will lead to war in a crisis. 
Between Death and a Grievous Wound 
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Most people think that the risk of holocaust evaporated with the end of the 
Cold War, and that the biggest nuclear threat comes from “rogue states” and terrorists. 
Most people are wrong. Losing a city or two will be horrible; a great power war may 
mean curtains for us all. While the chance of intentional world war is very low, the 
risk of accidental war remains. Indeed, with the decay of Russia‟s command, control 
and communications, it has probably risen. Even if the West has reached the “end of 
history,” with war among stable liberal democracies seeming all but impossible, this 
is not true of the rest of the world,
139
 including some powerful states with nuclear 
weapons. To think that we can get through even a century without serious great power 
rivalry is to discount all of modern history. Certainly, leading nuclear optimists do not 
believe this. If our present reliance on huge arsenals were the best realism had to 
offer, one could only agree that “[n]o serious thinker could...be satisfied with 
Realism…even if the scientific status of the theory were stronger than it is”140—for it 
would be a death sentence.  
In fact, neorealist optimism suggests a partial escape: minimum deterrence. 
States that have not begun developing nuclear weapons should not start. “If deterrence 
works in the West,” asks Jaswant Singh, “as it so obviously appears to, since Western 
nations insist on continuing to possess nuclear weapons—by what reasoning will it 
not work in India?”141 In reality, nuclear deterrence has only worked so far—and only 
because we were lucky. Indians and Pakistanis who take pride in their bombs plume 
themselves on what will wreck their cities and kill their descendants. But still more 
important, states with bloated arsenals should slim them. Neorealists should want 
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states to slash their arsenals even if it makes war more likely. As Paul Doty says, “The 
great gap...is…between a grievous but recoverable wound and death to most of the 
world as we know it.”142 On a liberal, Marxist or constructivist analysis, a failed 
attempt at minimum deterrence could conceivably short-circuit trends that can make 
war obsolete. But even if so, nuclear states can only justify large arsenals by working 
much harder to create conditions for their abolition. 
 This article has argued that nuclear optimism should lead us to support nuclear 
nonproliferation as well as deep cuts in arsenals and—if it is ever feasible—
disarmament. Some pessimists hold that organizational routines, bureaucratic politics 
and bounded rationality make control over nuclear weapons less reliable than 
optimists claim. If so, this only reinforces my prescriptions. Not only is the spread of 
nuclear weapons a bad thing, but it is yet another reason for Russia and the United 
States to downsize their arsenals to more manageable levels.
143
 
MOTIVATING JUST BEHAVIOR 
All these arguments may seem academic. Suppose that nuclear deterrence does 
exploit future generations—can any state be expected to renounce it? Nuclear war is 
one of many threats that humans pose to nature.
144
 Yet when the threat is not concrete, 
it is easy to ignore the problem, and hope that it is exaggerated, or will somehow go 
away.
145
 Global warming is starting, but will take some time to make itself felt. 
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Likewise, nuclear weapons may not make themselves felt at all until it is too late.
146
 
Faced with what activists believe is a threat to the very future of life on earth, mass 
publics remain infuriatingly complacent.
147
 Theorists, seeing that nuclear deterrence 
seems to benefit us, take for granted that it also benefits our distant descendants. This 
is not surprising, since, as E. H. Carr says, “[t]he doctrine of the harmony of 
interests....is the natural assumption of a prosperous and privileged class.”148  
Moreover, if the status quo benefits us, what is our incentive to act? By 
debunking the harmony of interests, Carr did not expect to turn the privileged 
countries into altruists; he hoped to make them more willing to bargain with 
revisionist states.
149
 But future people have little bargaining leverage.
150
  Schell‟s 
advice that “[t]he living [should]...look on the gift of life the way any political 
representative should look on election to office—as a temporary trust to be used for 
the common good”151 is an ideal rather than an enforcible policy. Corrupt politicians 
can anger living constituents. Unborn generations don‟t vote.152 Anti-nuclear 
campaigners and other environmental activists concerned with the distant future face a 
common challenge and should develop common strategies.
153
  
Nevertheless, Robert Goodin has argued that people can be persuaded to 
forego exploiting even helpless victims if the moral case is clear—though such 
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restraint goes only so far.
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state‟s insecurity.  
But the dilemma is not always so stark. Indians debated for decades whether to 
build the bomb.  Even when China went nuclear only two years after the Sino-Indian 
war of 1962, “there was no consensus among officials in New Delhi that it was 
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